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Resource Allocation with Population Dynamics
Jonathan Epperlein and Jakub Marecˇek∗
Abstract
Many analyses of resource-allocation problems employ simplistic mod-
els of the population. Using the example of a resource-allocation problem
of Marecˇek et al. [Int. J. Control 88(10), 2015], we introduce rather a
general behavioural model, where the evolution of a heterogeneous popu-
lation of agents is governed by a Markov chain. Still, we are able to show
that the distribution of agents across resources converges in distribution,
for suitable means of information provision, under certain assumptions.
The model and proof techniques may have wider applicability.
1 Introduction
There are resource-allocation problems encountered in almost every aspect of
human lives: from utilities such as power systems and water systems, to trans-
portation, and office space allocation. Many analyses of resource-allocation
problems employ simplistic models of the population which ignore much of the
complexity of human behaviour. Notice, for example, that the demand for a
resource is often non-stationary, as exemplified by the work-day morning rush
hour in transportation and the existence of predictable peaks in the demand
in many other domains. Notice, further, that humans may have access to only
very limited amount of information, but may still consider multiple criteria, and
that their appreciation of the criteria may vary over time. As an example of a
particular resource-allocation problem, we introduce a model of behaviour and
the related demand process, which captures both the multi-criteria aspects of
the decision making and non-stationarity of the demand process. Still, we show
that the distribution of agents across resources converges in distribution, for
suitable means of information provision and under certain assumptions.
As our running example, we consider the problems faced by transportation au-
thorities in charge of a road network composed of a number of road segments.
For each road segment, the travel time is, in principle, a time series with a data
point per a vehicle passing across the road segment. Transportation authorities
increasingly have information on traffic conditions throughout the road network
∗J. Epperlein and J. Marecˇek are at IBM Research – Ireland, B3 IBM Campus Damastown,
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at this level of detail, but want to broadcast much less information to the pub-
lic. Marecˇek et al. [17, 18, 19] have recently demonstrated that such information
provision should be seen as means of modulating the demand process and that
different means of modulation may lead to very different outcomes. Whereas,
for example, it is natural for each user to forecast the travel time as a scalar for
each route, if the transportation authorities announce two distinct scalar values
for two distinct alternative routes, the route with the lower scalar value an-
nounced may become congested, and if the authorities are truthful in reporting
the congestion, the congestion may alternate between the two alternative routes
in a sub-optimal limit-cycle behaviour, ad infinitum. In contrast, providing two
intervals for two distinct alternative routes may benefit from the uncertainty in
the response of the population. Marecˇek et al. used a rather simple behavioural
model, where the response of each agent is determined by its level of risk aver-
sion [19, 17] and possibly actuation delay [17], and the distribution of levels of
risk aversion in the population is sampled in a memory-less fashion.
In Section 2, we introduce a considerably more realistic behavioural model,
where the evolution of a heterogeneous population of agents is governed by a
Markov chain. Section 3 gives a brief summary of relevant results in the theory
of iterated function systems and their extension to recurrent iterated function
systems; using these results, we show in Section 4 that the distribution of agents
across resources converges in distribution, under certain assumptions. Section 5
illustrates the model and main result with a few simulations, and we explain
the importance of the result in the context of related work in Section 6, before
concluding with a variety of suggestions for future work in the field. Appendix A
details the crucial step of generating a transition matrix for the Markov chain
governing the population dynamics.
2 The Model
Let us consider a model consisting of three components [19, 17]: a set of re-
sources, a central authority that provides information about the resources, and
a population of agents, who make decisions as to which resource to use, based
solely on the information made available by the central authority and their
personal cost functions. Further, let us extend this model with population dy-
namics in Section 2.3.1. A summary of the model is presented in Figure 1. In
the following, we describe each of the components in detail.
2.1 Resources
There is a finite set {1, 2, . . . ,M} of resources, from which each agent chooses
exactly one at every time step. For example in transportation, the resources
would correspond to routes from origins to destinations provided by a road
infrastructure. The cost of using such a resource is modelled by continuous
2
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Figure 1: A signal flow of the model described in Section 2: The central author-
ity broadcasts at time t the signal st based on information collected up until
then (which does not include t itself). Every agent i makes its decision ait which
resource to use based on its policy ωi. The decisions of all agents generate the
new congestion profile nt, which then leads to the current cost profile c(nt); z
−1
denotes a unit delay.
cost functions (“link performance functions”) of the form cm(n
m
t ), where the
index m denotes the resource, and nmt denotes the number of agents choosing
resource m at time step t. Implicit in this form is the assumption of separability:
the performance of resource m depends only on the utilization of resource m
itself. In the transportation applications, the cost would correspond to the travel
time of a single driver along the route. The vector nt
def
=
[
n1t · · · nMt
]
is the
congestion profile.
2.2 Central Authority and Signalling Scheme
The central authority has access to the history of congestion profiles {nτ}t−1τ=1
and provides information derived from this history to all agents, with the aim
of lowering the social cost,
∑M
m=1(n
m
t /N)cm(n
m
t ), while being truthful, and
hence trustworthy. Here, the same two pieces of information, umt and v
m
t , are
provided to all agents about each resource m. One can imagine umt and v
m
t are,
for example, the minimum and maximum costs within a time window, mean
and variance over the same time window, or information about travel time and
tolls at resource m; see Table 1 for details and references. In all cases listed, the
signal st =
[
u1t v
1
t u
2
t · · · uMt vMt
]
remains in R2M .
For this paper, we use exponential smoothing on the past costs of resource m
3
to obtain umt , whereas v
m
t provides a measure of their volatility:
umt
def
= (1− q1)
(
cm(n
m
t−1) + q1cm(n
m
t−2) + · · ·+ qt−11 cm(nm1 )
)
vmt
def
= (1− q2)
(∣∣cm(nmt−1)− umt−1∣∣+ q2∣∣cm(nmt−2)− umt−2∣∣+ · · ·
+ qt−12
∣∣cm(nm1 )− um1 ∣∣),
(1)
which can be implemented recursively as
umt = q1u
m
t−1 + (1− q1)cm(nmt−1)
vmt = q2v
m
t−1 + (1− q2)
∣∣cm(nmt−1)− umt−1∣∣, (2)
thus requiring minimal storage at the central authority.
2.3 Agents and their Policies
Agents base their decisions at time t on the information provided by the central
authority at time t by applying their policies. The heterogeneity of the agent
population is taken into account by letting each agent have its own policy. Of
course, a lot of policies are imaginable; we consider here a set of policies that
is parametrized by ω ∈ [0, 1], a weight in each agent’s cost function: An agent
using policy ω will choose the resource m? that minimizes ωumt + (1−ω)vmt . In
other words, at time t agents with policy ω select resource
piω(st)
def
= arg min
m=1,...,M
ωumt + (1− ω)vmt . (3)
If for instance, umt (resp. v
m
t ) is the minimal (resp. maximal) cost of resource
m observed in the last r time steps, then agents with ω = 1 entirely disregard
the worst case and could be said to be risk-seeking; similarly, ω = 0 would be
risk-averse and ω = 0.5 risk-neutral. If instead a mean and toll are broadcast,
ω parametrizes the trade-off between each agent’s travel time and their wallet.
Of course, the population of agents in a road network changes over time. Marecˇek
et al. [19] modelled this by assuming that 1) the number N of agents is fixed
and 2) the distribution of policies ω among the agents is i.i.d., i.e. at each time
step, the distribution is selected from a finite set of distributions {η1, . . . , ηK}
according to a distribution d = (d1, . . . , dK). A little more formally: at each t,
choose µt from {η1, . . . , ηK} according to prob(µt = ηk) = dk; the population
of agents at time t is then µt.
2.3.1 Population Dynamics
Both assumptions – constant number of agents and i.i.d. replacement of the
population at every t – are not very realistic. Here, we replace the assumption
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of i.i.d. population renewal (according to the fixed distribution d) with a Markov
chain that makes d dynamic; in this way the new population selected at each
time step can depend on the previous population. For instance, it seems unlikely
that a population of mainly risk-averse drivers at one time step will give rise to
a population of mainly risk-seeking ones in the next instance, reflecting the fact
that not all users leave the road network at once, or that there might be some
correlation between, say, the time of day and what kind of drivers are on the
road.
More precisely: As before, we assume that there is a family of possible distri-
butions of the levels of risk aversion in the population, with a finite index set
K = {1, . . . ,K}. Additionally, there is a Markov chain with K states and transi-
tion probability matrix P ∈ [0, 1]K×K . The probability of appearance of popu-
lation ηj , j ∈ K, at iteration t+1 is now given by prob(µt+1 = ηj | µt = i) = pij ,
i.e. the probability of a specific ηj depends on what the last observed population
was. This setting is clearly more general: with pij = 1/K ∀i, j ∈ K, we recover
the original i.i.d. assumption.
The transition probabilities pij can be used to model different ideas about the
mechanism behind the change in populations. Two straightforward ones are
reviewed briefly here, more details are given in the appendix.
The Markov chain could be used to encode dependence of the population on the
time of day. As a simple example, say that there is a morning, noon, evening
and night population of drivers, perhaps many risk-seeking drivers at night,
mostly risk-neutral commuters in the morning, etc. Say those populations for
morning, noon, evening, and night are numbered as 1,2,3, and 4. The corre-
sponding transition matrix and adjacency graph are:
P =

0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0
 1
“noon”
“evening”
“night”
“morning”
2
3
4
A simple generalization allowing for more than just one population per time of
day can be achieved by replacing the “1”s by appropriate blocks, see Section A.1
for details.
If instead we are interested in a gradual change in population, e.g. due to individ-
ual drivers changing their behaviour or leaving and entering the road network,
then the probability of the next population being ηj given that the current
one is ηi should depend on “how different” they are from each other. In more
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mathematical terms, let ∆(·, ·) be a metric on the space of populations so that
∆(ηi, ηj) provides a notion of distance between the populations ηi and ηj . Then
the probability pij should be a decreasing function of ∆(ηi, ηj): the farther
apart ηi and ηj are, the less likely it is that one gives rise to the other in the
next time step. To this end, we choose a parameter ψ ∈ (0, 1) that reflects the
probability of an agent changing its policy, and let pij proportional to ψ
∆(ηi,ηj);
see Section A.2.
In the case of drivers changing their policies, more drastic changes (e.g. going
from risk-averse to risk-neutral) should contribute more to the distance than
slight changes; this can be described by a discrete version of the Wasserstein
metric (see Section A.2). If, however, we want to model drivers leaving the road
network and being replaced, then the distance ∆(ηi, ηj) should depend only on
how many drivers have to change policy to transform ηi into ηj (and not on
the size of those policy changes); let us call this metric the substitution metric,
since that is what it describes. Both of those notions are captured as special
cases of the so-called Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD, c.f. [27]). For details such
as definitions and computation, see Section A.2.
3 Iterated Function Systems (IFS)
An iterated function system is a generalization of a Markov chain. It consists
of a state space X with its metric d, a family W of Lipschitz functions1 W =
{wj : X → X | j ∈ K}, where K is some index set (finite, countably infinite or
worse, but let us assume here that it is countable) and a measure ν that makes
(K, ·, ν) a probability space.
At each iteration t of the IFS, j is selected from K according to ν and wj is
applied to the current state xt to obtain xt+1. Formally:
prob(Xt+1 ∈ A|Xt = xt) def=
∑
K
1{i|wi(xt)∈A}(j)ν(j),
i.e. the probability of xt+1 ending up in a set A is the probability of selecting an
index j such that wj(xt) is in A (the measure of the set of indices j for which
wj(xt) is in A). Here the Markov property is clear: the distribution of the next
state Xt+1 depends only on the current state xt and not any “older” states xt−1
etc.
In this way, the IFS “jumps” around X. Unless we have a degenerate case such
as all wj having the same fixed point, we can not expect the sequence {xt}∞t=0
to converge in a classical sense; instead, we can have a weaker form, convergence
in distribution: that there is a distribution Π on X such that as n → ∞, the
set {x0, x1, . . . , xn} will be distributed according to Π.
1A function f on the metric space (X, d) is Lipschitz with constant s, or “s-Lipschitz,” if
for all x, y ∈ X, we have d(f(x), f(y)) ≤ sd(x, y).
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Theorem 1 (E.g. [8, Thm. 1.1]). Let Lj denote the Lipschitz constant of wj
and assume that the IFS is contractive on average, i.e.∑
K
ν(j) log(Lj) < 0. (4)
Then, there is a distribution Π on X such that {x0, x1, . . . , xn} is distributed
according to Π as n→∞.
If W is a family of contractions, i.e. if Lj < 1 for all j, then (4) is trivially
satisfied.
IFS theory and congestion control The traffic model described above can
be recast as an IFS, where the index set is K = {1, . . . ,K}, and the ran-
domly chosen function applied to the congestion profile nt at each time step is
parametrized by the population distribution ηj . Theorem 1 can then be applied
to make the statement that there is a distribution Π such that, as t → ∞, nt
follows this distribution. In other words, nt will not be totally erratic, but it
will be predictable in the sense that it will eventually behave like samples from
a random variable with a fixed distribution.
3.1 Recurrent IFSs
The assumption in e.g. [19] of i.i.d. population renewal at each time step was
necessary in order to apply Theorem 1, as the probability measure ν is not
allowed to change over time or depend on the state x. However, extensions that
relax this do exist, e.g. [20, 2]. Here, we consider the extension in [3], where
a recurrent iterated function system (RIFS) is introduced as an IFS with an
underlying Markov chain that modifies ν at each time step. More precisely:
We have an IFS as described in the last section with a finite index set K, say
K = {1, . . . ,K}. Additionally, there is a Markov Chain with K states and
transition probability matrix P ∈ [0, 1]K×K . The probability of applying wj at
iteration t + 1 is now given by prob(it+1 = j|it) = pitj , i.e. the probability of
applying a specific wj depends on what the last applied function wit was! This
is in contrast to the case of Section 3, where the probability to select a specific
wj was always the same and given by ν(j).
This setting is clearly more general: for a classical IFS, we can simply choose
pij = 1/K ∀i, j ∈ K. On the other hand, the way that Xt jumps around in
X now is not a Markov process anymore — the distribution of Xt not only
depends on Xt−1, but also on it−1 — but the joint process of (Xt, it) jumping
around in X ×K is.
Results analogous to Theorem 1 can be stated for this case, see e.g. [2, 3]. We
state
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Theorem 2 ([3]). Assume we have an RIFS as described above, and let m :
{1, . . . ,K} → [0, 1] denote the stationary distribution of the underlying Markov
chain (i.e. m corresponds to the normalized Perron eigenvector of PT ). Then,
if
K∑
i=1
m(i) logLi = Em{logLi} < 0, (5)
there is a unique stationary distribution ν˜ of the Markov process (Xt, it) and Xt
converges in distribution to ν with ν(B) = ν˜(B × K). Here, Li again denotes
the Lipschitz constant of wi, and Em denotes expected value with respect to m.
Proof. This is just a corollary (much weaker, but sufficient for our purposes) to
[3, Thm. 2.1 (ii)], which follows by taking n = 1 and removing the specifics of
the stationary distributions.
If (5) holds, we again say that the RIFS is average contractive or contractive on
average.
That means that the model in Section 2 can be made more general while staying
amenable to a similar stability analysis.
4 The Main Result
The traffic model described above can be recast as iterated applications of func-
tions to the broadcast signals st, where the function to apply is chosen from a
family whose index set is K = {1, . . . ,K}, with the next population of agents
depending on the current population. At each iteration t, it+1 is selected from
K according to the it-th row of P , and the computation of the signals and the
response of the population is captured by wit+1 being applied to the current
signal st to obtain st+1. That, and under which conditions, we can hope for
convergence in distribution of the signalling process and the congestion profile
is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 3. There exists a set of constants κ′m, m = 1, . . . ,M such that if the
costs cm(·) are 1/κ′m-Lipschitz (with respect to the 1-norm), the signal st and
the congestion profile nt converge in distribution as t→∞.
Proof.
Step 1: We begin by writing the signalling process {st} generated by the model
described in Section 2 and Figure 1 as an IFS on the state-space X = R2M+
along similar lines as in [19]. Recall that
st =
[
u1t v
1
t u
2
t · · · uMt vMt
]
8
and assume the signalling scheme described in (1) and (2); we repeat for con-
venience:
umt = q1u
m
t−1 + (1− q1)cm(nmt−1)
vmt = q2v
m
t−1 + (1− q2)
∣∣cm(nmt−1)− umt−1∣∣. (6)
Now observe that
umt+1 = q1u
m
t + (1− q1)cm(nmt ), (7)
but
nmt = card
({
i | ait = m
})
=
N∑
i=1
δait,m =
N∑
i=1
∑
ω∈Ω
δωi,ωδpiω(st),m
=
∑
ω∈Ω
(
N∑
i=1
δωi,ω
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸1{σ|σumt +(1−σ)vmt <σust+(1−σ)vst ∀s6=m}(ω)
=
∑
ω∈Ω
µt(ω) 1{σ|σumt +(1−σ)vmt <σust+(1−σ)vst ∀s6=m}(ω), (8)
where
δait,m = 1{j|ajt=m}(i) =
{
1 if ait = m
0 else.
is the Kronecker symbol, so δωi,ω is 1 if agent i has policy ω, and δpiω(st),m is 1
if policy ω selects resource m. Now, (8) is unwieldy, but close inspection reveals
that it shows that for fixed µt, n
m
t is just a function of st (through u
s
t and v
s
t ,
s = 1, . . . , N), and plugging this into (6), we see that st+1 can be written as a
function of st, parametrized by the random variable µt:
st+1 = wj(st) if µt = ηj .
The size of the index set K, i.e. the number K of possible distributions, is likely
gigantic, namely
K =
(
card(Ω) +N − 1
N
)
,
but nevertheless finite.
Step 2: Next, it will be established that if the cm are Lipschitz, then so are the
wj of Step 1. For this, let x, y ∈ R2M+ , x 6= y (they play the role of two possible
st−1) and fix the population µt to some ηj . From (8) it then follows that the
congestion profile at time t is just a function of the signal broadcast at st−1, i.e.
x or y. Let us write nmt (x) to reflect this. To investigate the Lipschitz constant
of wj , we write
‖wj(x)− wj(y)‖1 =
M∑
m=1
Rm1 +R
m
2 ,
9
where
Rm1
def
=
∣∣∣q1x2m−1 + (1 − q1)cm(nmt (x)) − [q1y2m−1 + (1− q1)cm(nmt (y))]∣∣∣
and
Rm2
def
=
∣∣∣∣∣q2x2m + (1− q2) ∣∣cm(nmt−1(x))− x2m−1∣∣
−
[
q2y2m + (1− q2) |cm(nmt (y))− y2m−1|
]∣∣∣∣∣
where the first term in the sum corresponds to umt+1 and the second to v
m
t+1. We
shall investigate those two terms separately, but first we repeat an important
result from the proof of Theorem 1, specifically equation (15), in [19], namely
that nmt (·) is Lipschitz in the 1-norm, so there is a constant κm such that
|nmt (x)− nmt (y)| ≤ κm max
ω
µ(ω) ‖x− y‖1 ≤ κmN ‖x− y‖1 . (9)
With (9), we then have∣∣cm(nmt (x))− cm(nmt (y))∣∣ ≤ Lm |nmt (x)− nmt (y)| ≤ LmκmN ‖x− y‖1 ,
where Lm denotes the Lipschitz constant of cm.
Now we can bound
Rm1 =
∣∣∣q1(x2m−1 − y2m−1) + (1− q1)cm(nmt (x))− cm(nmt (y))∣∣∣ ≤
q1
∣∣x2m−1 − y2m−1∣∣+ (1− q1)LmκmN ‖x− y‖1
and
Rm2 =∣∣∣q2(x2m − y2m) + (1− q2)(∣∣cm(nmt−1(x))− x2m−1∣∣− ∣∣cm(nmt−1(y))− y2m−1∣∣)∣∣∣ ≤
q2 |x2m − y2m|+ (1− q2)
(|x2m−1 − y2m−1|+ ∣∣cm(nmt−1(x))− cm(nmt−1(y))∣∣) ≤
q2 |x2m − y2m|+ (1− q2) |x2m−1 − y2m−1|+ (1− q2)LmκmN ‖x− y‖1 ,
where we used that |a− b| − |a′ − b′| ≤ |a− a′|+ |b− b′|, which can be derived
using the reverse triangle inequality.2 Reassembling and slight reordering of
2|a−b|−|a′−b′| ≤
∣∣∣|a−b|−|a′−b′|∣∣∣ ≤ |a−b−(a′−b′)| = |a−a′+b′−b| ≤ |a−a′|+ |b−b′|
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terms yields
‖wj(x)− wj(y)‖1 =
M∑
m=1
Rm1 +R
m
2 ≤
M∑
m=1
(1+q1−q2) |x2m−1 − y2m−1|+q2 |x2m − y2m|+(2−q1−q2)LmκmN ‖x− y‖1 ≤(
max{q2, 1 + q1 − q2}+ (2− q1 − q2)N
M∑
m=1
Lmκm
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
def
= L¯µ
‖x− y‖1 (10)
and so we have found an expression for (an upper bound of) the Lipschitz
constant L¯j of wj .
Step 3: Now we are in a position to formulate sufficient conditions on Lm to
allow application of Theorem 2. The condition∑
j∈K
m(j) log L¯j < 0
is certainly satisfied independently of m (recall that m is the stationary distri-
bution of the underlying Markov chain) if L¯j < 1 for all j. This is the case
if
M∑
m=1
Lmκm <
1−max{q2, 1 + q1 − q2}
N (2− q1 − q2) (11)
Hence the κ′m postulated in the theorem statement need to satisfy
M∑
m=1
κm
κ′m
<
1−max{q2, 1 + q1 − q2}
N (2− q1 − q2) .
One choice is
κ′m = κmM
N (2− q1 − q2)
1−max{q2, 1 + q1 − q2} , (12)
but there are obviously many more.
Hence, step 1 shows that the signalling process {st} can be cast as an RIFS
on the normed space (R2M , ‖·‖1) with a family of functions
{
wj | j ∈ K
}
, that
by step 2 are Lipschitz. By step 3, under the right conditions, this RIFS is
contractive on average and by Theorem 2, we then conclude that st converges
in distribution. Since, by (8), nt is a function of the two random variables st
and µt, the congestion profile also converges in distribution.
Remark 1. Of course, Lipschitz constants have to be nonnegative, and thus (11)
implies that in order for the proof to work, q2 > q1 has to hold.
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Figure 2: Three examples. Top left: Cost functions x2 + 0.4 (dashed) and
(x3 + 0.7)/1.7 (solid line). Top right: The corresponding social cost with opti-
mum of approximately 0.473 at 0.47 (dashed vertical line). Middle left: Cost
functions x/10+2 (dashed) and 1+1/(1.1−x)/22 (solid line). Middle right: The
corresponding social cost with optimum of approximately 0.387 at 0.06 (dashed
vertical line). Bottom left: Cost functions x+2 (dashed) and 1+1/(1.1−x)/22
(solid line). Bottom right: The corresponding social cost with optimum of ap-
proximately 1.315 at 0.1 (dashed vertical line).
Remark 2. While it is necessary for cm(·) to be Lipschitz in order for the theory
of RIFSs to apply, the bounds in (12) are far from tight, due to conservative
approximations made in the proof. For instance in (9), maxω µ(ω) is bounded
by N . This bound is obviously only tight for populations where all agents have
the same policy; for most populations, it is a gross overestimation. Additionally,
numerical computations of m, the stationary distribution of the Markov chain,
indicate that the stationary probability m(i) of such populations, and hence their
weight m(i) in (5), is typically very small, and this bound could most likely be
improved upon.
5 A Computational Illustration
Let us now illustrate the main result on a number of examples. Throughout,
we use M = 2, three variants of c1(x) and c2(x) as suggested in Figure 2,
and q1 = 0.45, q2 = 0.5. First, consider an example with N = 2 agents and
Ω = {0, 0.5, 1}, i.e., card(Ω) = 3 policies and K = (card(Ω)+N−1N ) = 6 possible
distributions, assuming that every distribution possible in theory is also sensible
in practice. One possible transition matrix for the case of the Wasserstein metric
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is, up to rounding,
PW =

0.35 0.18 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.06
0.22 0.28 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.09
0.14 0.18 0.29 0.12 0.18 0.14
0.14 0.18 0.12 0.29 0.18 0.14
0.09 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.28 0.22
0.06 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.35
 ,
whereas the corresponding transition matrix for the substitution metric is
PS =

0.44 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.07
0.18 0.36 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.07
0.07 0.14 0.44 0.06 0.14 0.07
0.18 0.14 0.07 0.36 0.14 0.18
0.07 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.36 0.18
0.07 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.44
 .
For instance, this reflects that in the former case there is a 28-35% chance of
the population remaining the same, whereas in the latter, this chance is 36-44%.
For details on how these matrices are obtained, we again refer to Appendix A.
The corresponding behaviour is captured in Figure 3, where each time-series
has been obtained as the mean over 10,000 sample paths3, with error bars at
one standard deviation. Notice that in the case of M = 2, the social cost∑M
m=1(n
m
t /N)cm(n
m
t ) is determined by n
1
t alone, justifying the notation C(n
1
t )
. Throughout, as proven, one observes the convergence in distribution.
Next, consider an example with N = 20 and Ω = {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}, i.e. 4 policies
and 1771 distributions. The 1771 × 1771 transition matrices PS and PW are
displayed in Figures 4 and 5. Note that generating each PW requires solving
1770 · 1771/2 = 1, 567, 335 instances of the linear program (LP), as described
in Appendix A. The corresponding behaviour is captured in Figure 6, again
with each time-series obtained as the mean over 10,000 sample paths and error
bars at one standard deviation. As in Figure 3, one observes the convergence
in distribution throughout. Unlike in Figure 3, in the middle and bottom rows,
one also observes convergence to a distribution concentrated around the optima
of social cost of approximately 0.387 (middle) and 1.315 (bottom), respectively.
Although the concentration of the limiting distribution around the true optimum
cannot be proven generically, its appearance for larger N seems most intriguing.
6 Related Work
Our work builds upon a rich history of research in choice modelling [5, 26]
and intelligent transportation systems [25]. There, any given user is associated
3 Notice that although the horizon may seem short and the number of sample paths may
seem low, this is justified by our main result, i.e., the convergence in distribution. Indeed, one
may argue that convergence in distribution allows for a principled use of simulations.
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Figure 3: The behaviour of N = 2 agents on the three examples of Figure 2,
considering both the Wasserstein metric (in red) and the discrete metric (in
blue). Top left: Evolution of state over time for x2 +0.4 and (x3 +0.7)/1.7. Top
right: The corresponding evolution of the social cost. Middle left: Evolution
of state over time for x/10 + 2 and 1 + 1/(1.1 − x)/22. Middle right: The
corresponding evolution of the social cost. Bottom left: Evolution of state over
time for x+2 and 1+1/(1.1−x)/22. Bottom right: The corresponding evolution
of the social cost.
with an origin-destination pair, and hence with a set {1, 2, . . . ,M} of routes
connecting the two points. In the prevailing research direction, it is assumed
that the perceived utility of a route m for user n is determined by a scalar
un,mt
def
= cm(n
m
t ) + 
n,m
t , where 
n,m
t is a random variable specific to the route,
user, and time. The probability that user n picks 1 ≤ m ≤M at time t is:
probθ(u
n,m
t < u
n,m′
t ∀ m′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} \ {m}) = (13)
probθ(cm(n
m
t ) + 
n,m
t < cm′(n
m′
t ) + 
n,m′
t ∀ m′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M} \ {m}),
where θ is the probability distribution of the vector nt
def
= (n,1t , 
n,2
t , . . . , ).
Clearly, the the next-step utilisation can then be expressed as an expectation
of the perceived utility with respect to the distribution θ, or as by integrating
over nt . There are a number of popular choices of θ, with varying complexity
of the integration over nt .
The first such choice model [5] is the Multinomial Logit (MNL) of [9], which
assumes that n,mt are independent and identically distributed Gumbel random
variables. There, the equilibrium is computable as a convex program, under the
assumption it exists and the cost functions are convex, but one may struggle to
justify the fact that overlapping routes have uncorrelated n,1t . In contrast, in
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Figure 4: Transition matrices according to the Wasserstein metric with N = 20
agents and Ω = {0, 1/3, 2/3, 1} for two different values of ψ. The apparent
fractal structure is an artefact of the order chosen for the populations ηi (Tech-
nically, this is referring to an order relation on the set {0, . . . , N}card(Ω), in which
the possible populations make up the subset of tuples summing to N . The lexi-
cographic order is chosen for the figures, however the effect of a different choice
is merely cosmetic.)
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Figure 5: Transition matrices for the discrete metric with N = 20 agents and
card(Ω) = 4 policies for two different values of ψ. The same comments as for
Figure 4 apply.
the Multinomial Probit (MNP) model of [7], nt is assumed to be a multivari-
ate normal random vector with mean 0 and a given covariance matrix. There,
assuming the conditions for the existence of an equilibrium, one considers un-
constrained minimisation of an integral in the computation of the equilibrium
values. This has been extended in a number of ways, to obtain nested logit
models [5], path-size logit [13], multinomial Weibit [6], c-logit [31], and yet
more recent models [21, 1] considering distributionally robust optimisation over
all distributions with mean 0 and the given covariance matrix. These models
share a number of features, notably given travel costs cm(n
m
t ) and stochastic
n,mt , and the existence of an equilibrium, under certain assumptions.
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Figure 6: The behaviour of N = 20 agents on the three examples of Figure 2,
considering both the Wasserstein metric (in red) and the discrete metric (in
blue). Top left: Evolution of state over time for x2 +0.4 and (x3 +0.7)/1.7. Top
right: The corresponding evolution of the social cost. Middle left: Evolution
of state over time for x/10 + 2 and 1 + 1/(1.1 − x)/22. Middle right: The
corresponding evolution of the social cost. Bottom left: Evolution of state over
time for x+2 and 1+1/(1.1−x)/22. Bottom right: The corresponding evolution
of the social cost. Notice the considerable difference in the evolutions of state
and cost in the middle and bottom row, where c2(x) are the same and c1(x) are
rather similar.
In an alternative line of research, one assumes that the travel costs cn(n
m
t ) are
a stationary random process, or a random variable with a distribution fixed
over time. One can obtain a multi-parametric route choice model based on
risk measures of the random variable and users’ choice based on a level of risk-
aversion weighing the risk measures, as in (3). Based on early simulations [15],
a variety of such models have been analysed rigorously, recently, e.g., based
on expectation and variance [4, 23] and expectation and value at risk [24, 22],
which is sometimes known as the percentile equilibrium. Notice that in this
line of research, the travel costs are exogenous random variable, which again
makes it possible to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, under certain
assumptions.
Notice that much of the research on exogenous uncertainty in travel costs, as well
as the research on choice models such as MNL and MNP, focuses on the condi-
tions for the existence and computations of equilibria. In theory, the restriction
to the existence of equilibria is rather unfortunate [11, 14], as it obscures the
complexity of the possible behaviour of the non-linear dynamics. In practice,
it may be very hard for the transportation authorities to steer the system to-
16
ward the equilibrium, while maintaining the trust of the users, which may be
require the information provided to be truthful, in some sense. [17, 19] show
that when one considers the truthful information provision, announcing a func-
tion of cm(n
m
t−1) to all users at time t, the equilibria do not exists, in general.
For example, in the simple case of truthful provision of costs cm(n
m
t−1), with
users’ choice based on a scalar perceived utility, it is easy to observe a limit-
cycle behaviour in a two-route example, where the traffic alternates between the
routes, c.f., Appendix 1 of [19]. Even beyond this very simple control strategy,
many standard controllers studied in control theory do fail [10] to stabilise the
system. The study of the related dynamical systems without equilibria [30] is
hence rather more recent, and often connected to the control of traffic lights
(also known as signals), where it has been long recognised that the non-linear
dynamics have limit cycles and yet more complex forms of behaviour.
Still, one may want to consider both the the costs cm(n
m
t ) and their perceptions
as non-stationary random processes, generated by the underlying non-linear
dynamics. Marecˇek et al. [17, 19, 18] have studied measure-theoretic notions
of convergence within such models, where cm(n
m
t ) are non-stationary random
processes, based on a closed-loop model with umt and v
m
t being functions of
the history of nmt−1, n
m
t−2, . . .. Subsequently, the two-parametric choice model
arg minm=1,...,M ωu
m
t + (1 − ω)vmt in (3), in the spirit of bounded rationality
[28] is used, as in [4, 23, 24, 22]. An overview of the choices of parameters
umt and v
m
t is provided in Table 1. In (δ, γ)-signalling [17], there is one con-
stant δm per resource m and one independent identically distributed (i.i.d.)
uniform random variable νmt with support [−δm/2, δm/2] per resource m and
time step t. Subsequently, one defines umt and v
m
t as cm(n
m
t−1) + ν
m
t − δm/2
and cm(n
m
t−1) + ν
m
t + δ
m/2, respectively, resembling (13). In r-extreme sig-
nalling [19], (umt , v
m
t ) is the minimum and maximum over a time window of size
r, i.e., within nmt−1, n
m
t−2, . . . , n
m
t−r. Finally, in r-supported signalling [18], one
minimises social cost C over the sub-intervals of minimum and maximum over
a time window of size r, with certain restrictions on (umt , v
m
t ) captured by the
inclusion in a set P (St,Ω), so as to minimise the next-step social cost. Many
options remain to be explored.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We have studied the stability of resource allocation, where a central authority
broadcasts two values for each resource and agents take a convex combination
of the two values, with the distribution of the convexifying coefficients across
the population varying over time in a non-stationary fashion. Our contributions
are as follows:
I A behavioural model, which does not simplify the nonlinear dynamics to
a fixed point and considers evolution of the levels of risk-aversion in the
population governed by a Markov chain.
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I Novel means of information provision in resource-allocation problems,
based on exponential smoothing of the past costs and past variance in
the costs.
I A convergence result for the particular behavioural model and the partic-
ular means of information provision, whose proof technique may be more
widely applicable.
This may spur much further research, along several directions.
One direction may focus on the wide variety of means of deriving the information
to broadcast, some of which are suggested in Table 1. Outside of (A) further
variants of the exponential smoothing, one could consider (B) the provision of
the expected value and variance, c.f. [4, 23], (C) the expectation and value at
risk for a given coefficient α and distribution function L with support {cm(nmt )}t,
c.f. [24, 22], and (D) the expectation and conditional value at risk, also known
as the expected shortfall, with the same distribution. For both the previously
studied variants and those suggested in Table 1 for the first time, bounds on
the concentration of the limiting distribution around its mean, and conditions
for the mean being socially optimal, remain a major open problem. One may
also bound the rate of convergence, c.f. [29], using the coupling argument of
Hairer [12]. Although such arguments are somewhat technical, they allow for a
principled use of simulations, with confidence bounds for a particular simulation
set-up.
We also believe that the model of behaviour we have introduced is rich enough
so as to allow the application in many other domains. For example in power
systems, prices may be adjusted dynamically, but are currently not announced
in real time, so as to prevent additional fluctuations in demand, leading to
additional costs. A key open problem hence is how to provide the information
on prices in a predictable and socially optimal fashion. One option may be to
provide retail consumers with information on both the costs of energy and levels
of pollution. Assuming each customer weighs these differently, one may apply
a similar model for the evolution of the distribution of such a coefficient across
the population. Similar reasoning may be applicable more broadly.
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Related work:
Ref. Name umt v
m
t
[17] (δ, γ)-signalling cm(n
m
t−1) + ν
m
t − δm/2 cm(nmt−1) + νt + δm/2
[19] r-extreme signalling arg minj=t−r,...,t−1{cm(nmj )} arg maxj=t−r,...,t−1{cm(nmj )}
[18] r-supported signalling projumt arg min(u
m
t ,v
m
t )∈P (St,Ω) C(nt) projvmt arg min(umt ,vmt )∈P (St,Ω) C(nt)
Here Exponential smoothing q1u
m
t−1 + (1− q1)cm(nmt−1) q2vmt−1 + (1− q2)
∣∣cm(nmt−1)− umt−1∣∣
Future work suggestions:
Ref. Name umt v
m
t
A Variants of smoothing q1u
m
t−1 + (1− q1)cm(nmt−1) q2umt−1 + (1− q2)cm(nmt−1)
B Mean and variance 1r
∑
j=t−r,...,t−1 cm(n
m
j )
1
r
∑
j=t−r,...,t−1(cm(n
m
j )− umt )2
C Mean and value at risk 1r
∑
j=t−r,...,t−1 cm(n
m
j ) VaRα
def
= inf{l ∈ R : prob(L > l) ≤ 1− α}
D Mean and conditional VaR 1r
∑
j=t−r,...,t−1 cm(n
m
j ) CVaRα
def
= 1α
∫ α
0
VaRγdγ
Table 1: A comprehensive overview of the related work and suggestions for future work within two-parameter information
provision and two-parameter route choice formulations.
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A The Transition Matrix P
In order to run simulations, and possibly also to obtain tighter theoretical re-
sults than Theorem 3, based on the model of population dynamics proposed in
Section 2.3.1, it is necessary to compute a transition matrix P for the Markov
chain generating the driver populations. We elaborate here on this procedure.
A.1 P to Encode Time Dependence
If P is used to model the dependence of the populations on an underlying tempo-
ral process, such as the time of day changing, the Markov chain would resemble
a cycle: the state is forced to progress from morning to noon to afternoon and
so on, until the day is over and everything repeats, there would be no transitions
backwards. As explained in Section 2.3.1, the simplest encoding of that would
yield a matrix P that is a unit shift, with ones on the first superdiagonal and
a 1 one in the left bottom corner (if the different times of day are numbered
appropriately). This would reflect a deterministic behaviour and thus again not
be very realistic. Instead, there should be several possible populations per time
of day. To illustrate the idea, consider the same example as in section 2.3.1, but
assume there are now two different possible noon populations that both have
the same probability. Then, P would be
P =

0 .5 .5 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0
 ,
reflecting that if it was “morning” at time t, at time t+1 there is a 0.5 probability
for each of the noon populations, but that in either case at t + 2 we will have
the afternoon population.
Formally: Assume there are T times of day, each with a set of N` different
populations, all of which are equally probable. That would be reflected in a
transition matrix
P =

0N1×N1
1
N2
1N1×N2 0N1×N3 · · · 0N1×NT
0N2×N1 0N2×N2
1
N3
1N2×N3
. . .
...
...
. . .
. . .
0NT−1×N1
. . . 1
NT
1NT−1×NT
1
N1
1NT×N1 0NT×N2 · · · 0NT×NT

,
where 0M×N and 1M×N denote M ×N matrices of all zeros and ones, respec-
tively.
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A.2 Earth Mover’s Distances (EMDs)
The Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) between histograms (which in the text have
been also called populations and distributions) gets its name from interpreting
a histogram as a pile of dirt. To transform one histogram into another, the dirt
has to be rearranged; the ground distance between two to bins (or categories)
is the work necessary to move one unit of dirt from one bin to the other, and
the distance ∆(η, γ) between two histograms η and γ (with the same categories)
is then defined as the minimal work necessary to transform one histogram into
the other. For our purposes, the dirt corresponds to the agents, and the bins
correspond to the policies Ω.
The choice of ground distance h(ω, ω′) between policies ω and ω′ now depends
on what brings about the change of individual policies. As already mentioned
in Section 2.3.1, if an individual driver’s policy does not change, but the driver
instead leaves the road network and is replaced by a new driver, then h(ω, ω′)
should only reflect that an agent has to be replaced, but be independent of ω
and ω′:
h(ω, ω′) = 1− δω,ω′ =
{
0 if ω = ω′
1 if ω 6= ω′.
If instead the drift of an individual driver’s policy is to be modelled, h(·, ·) should
reflect the fact that drastic changes are less likely to occur than slight ones; in
other words the ground distance h(ω, ω′) needs to be greater if the difference
|ω − ω′| is. One particularly simple choice is
h(ω, ω′) = |ω − ω′| .
This special case of an EMD is better known – especially in the case of continu-
ous distributions – as the Wasserstein distance, and we will call it by this name,
too.
In either case, computation of ∆(·, ·) requires solving an optimization problem,
as there are many ways to “rearrange the dirt,” but not all of them are optimal.
For any choice of h(·, ·), the EMD can be computed as the solution of a linear
program (LP), and if, as in our case, the items counted by the histograms cannot
be divided into smaller units, an integer linear program (ILP): Let xij denote the
amount of agents changing policy from ωi to ωj , and let the card(Ω)× card(Ω)
matrix H have elements Hij = h(ωi, ωj). Then the minimal amount of work
necessary to transform η into γ is the optimal cost of
minimize y = tr(HTX) =
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
xijh(ωi, ωj)
subject to

xij ≥ 0 xij ∈ Z
1TX = ηT
X1 = γ.
(LP)
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Then,
∆(η, γ)
def
= yopt.
Remark 3. For the substitution metric, we have
H = 1card(Ω)×card(Ω) − Icard(Ω).
Remark 4. (LP) has the form of a so-called transportation problem. Hence,
if the problem data is integer, then there is always an integer optimum. In the
present case, η and γ are integer by definition, so the only concern is H for the
Wasserstein metric. However, if we choose all ωi to be rational, then multiplying
H by their least common denominator (or simply all denominators) renders H
integer without changing the optimal solutions Xopt. This class of problems
also allows more efficient solution than a general LP via special algorithms, see
e.g. [16].
The probability of transitioning from η to γ should of course be smaller if the
distance ∆(η, γ) (i.e. the “work” required) is greater; hence, if now ~ηi and ~ηj
denote two populations, then pij should be a bounded, nonnegative, decreasing
function of ∆(~ηi, ~ηj). One class of functions satisfying all requirements is pij =
αψ∆(~ηi,~ηj), where ψ ∈ (0, 1) and α is a normalization factor to make the resulting
matrix P row-stochastic. Then, we can construct P from
p˜ij = ψ
∆(~ηi,~ηj)
pij = p˜ij
/ (∑
k
p˜ik
)
.
The parameter ψ can be interpreted as a measure of the probability of one agent
changing policy (for whatever reason). For ψ = 1, we get pij = 1/K ∀i, j, i.e.
we recover the i.i.d. case of e.g. [19].
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